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Are Canadian banks ready for Basel III? 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to analyze and test the current liquidity coverage ratio of Canadian banks’, and draw 
conclusions about the readiness of Canadian banks to meet Basel III regulations. 
Liquidity coverage ratios for six major Canadian banks were calculated using the liquid assets and liabilities listed 
on their balance sheets from 2009 to 2013. The actual assets that meet Basel III requirements could not be acquired, 
as this is private information that does not have to be released until 2015.  
Five of the six major Canadian banks that were examined are likely to be able to meet Basel III requirements in 
2015. While some of the banks are already on their way to achieving full 2019 compliance, one of the banks is only 
barely meeting the 2015 requirements, raising the question of whether it will be able to meet and maintain Basel III 
liquidity requirements. 
The limitation of this study is that the liquidity coverage ratio formula used in Basel III could not be calculated, as 
the specific assets that meet Basel III requirements could not be obtained for the Canadian banks. The implication is 
that Canadian regulators need to focus attention on those banks that have been shown to be potentially unable to 
meet Basel III liquidity requirements. 
The value of this study is based in part on the lack of similar studies conducted on Canadian banks. This is one of 
the few studies of this nature not conducted on banks in the United States or the United Kingdom. 
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Introduction 
 The 2008 financial crisis has largely been blamed on the risks taken by banks related to their investments in 
the mortgage and derivatives markets that resulted in a lack of liquidity (Jordan, Branch, McQuay, Cooper & Smith, 
2013). Major financial institutions such as Bear Stearns, Northern Rock and AIG, which were major sources of 
loans and funding for individuals and banks, not only lacked the liquidity to be able to make loans, but actually 
lacked the funds needed to remain financially viable (Bessis, 2011). The resulting need for countries such as the 
United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) to provide massive bailouts to banks caused the issue of bank 
liquidity to become a major issue (Asongu, 2013). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision implemented new 
guidelines, known as Basel III, to increase bank liquidity as a way of reducing the threat for a future financial crisis 
such as the one that occurred in 2008 (Gomes & Khan, 2011). 
 Much of the academic literature about bank liquidity and Basel III has been focused on financial 
institutions in the US and the UK. Little attention has been given to the issue of bank liquidity for Canadian banks, 
or their ability to meet liquidity coverage ratios under the Basel III guidelines. The purpose of this study is to 
analyze and test the current Canadian bank liquidity coverage ratio in order to draw conclusions about the readiness 
of Canadian banks to meet Basel III regulations. The motivation for carrying out this investigation is to better 
understand the liquidity issues and readiness of Canadian banks to meet Basel III requirements by using data from 
Canadian banks themselves, rather than making inferences from data collected from banks in the US or the UK. The 
importance of this study is that the results of the data analysis performed can be used by researchers, practitioners, 
and government officials to determine what further actions may be needed in Canada in order to ensure that 
Canadian bank liquidity will meet the increasing liquidity coverage ratios mandated under Basel III requirements.  
 The key findings of this study are that most of the larger Canadian banks are ready to meet Basel III 
liquidity coverage ratio requirements. In fact, some of the large Canadian banks are almost to the point of being able 
to meet the full 100% liquidity coverage ratio, which does not take effect until 2019. Unfortunately, there is one 
large Canadian bank that shows potential signs of trouble when it comes to whether it will be able to meet the earlier 
2015 liquidity coverage ratio requirement, as well as whether it will be able to meet the increases in liquidity 
coverage in subsequent years.  
 This paper begins with an examination of the relevant literature to this study, including information about 
liquidity ratios and Basel III requirements, bank liquidity in general, and the conceptual framework of the liquidity 
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coverage ratio. Next, an explanation of the methodology used to carry out this investigation is provided. Then, an 
explanation of the results of the analysis performed on the data collected for this study is outlined, followed by the 
conclusions drawn from the results of this study.  
Literature review 
Liquidity ratios and Basel III 
 The International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring, better known as 
Basel III, was published in December 2010 as a means of addressing the concerns of bank liquidity that arose with 
the financial crisis that began in 2008 (Gomes & Khan, 2011). One of the most important parts of the Basel III 
requirements is the use of liquidity ratios to measure the assets that banks hold in relation to their liabilities 
(Ramona, 2013). Liquidity ratios provide a quantitative measure to creditors and investors about the ability of a 
business or institution to cover its liabilities. In the case of banks, the use of liquidity ratios under Basel III is viewed 
as a means of ensuring that those banks have enough high-quality assets to cover the risks that they take when 
loaning money to individuals and investors (Gomes & Khan, 2011). Monitoring the level of assets to the level of 
liabilities taken on by banks is meant to ensure that banks do not take on the high levels of risks they did during the 
early 2000s when they engaged in the sale of large amounts of sub-prime mortgages and other high-risk derivative 
investments that led to the financial crisis in 2008 (Vasile & Nitescu, 2012).  
 One of the problems that arose in the years leading up to the financial crisis is that banks invested heavily 
in long-term liabilities, such as mortgages, without considering their abilities to meet short-term obligations. As 
banks invest in long-term liabilities such as mortgage loans, a problem of short-term liquidity can arise. If a bank 
suddenly finds that depositors withdraw large amounts of funds, they may not have the short-term liquidity to 
maintain operations, because turning a long-term mortgage liability into short-term capital is often difficult 
(Hartlage, 2012). The goal of Basel III requirements is to ensure that banks can withstand a 30-day financial shock 
by having enough liquid assets that can be used to maintain operations during such an event (Gromova-Schneider & 
Niziolek, 2011). It is believed that with the Basel III requirements, banks will have to be much more aware of the 
amount of long-term liabilities they face, and will be forced to consider their own liquidity as a basis for making 
lending and investment decisions (Bank for International Settlements, 2013). 
Liquidity risk 
 In order to discuss the concept of liquidity risk, it is necessary to define what is meant by the term 
“liquidity”. It has been noted that liquidity is a term that is often easier to identify than to actually define, because it 
can be defined differently in different contexts (Clerc, 2008). For example, market liquidity is the trading of a 
particular amount of assets or securities in a market without a significant impact on their price (Wu & Hong, 2012). 
Market liquidity increases when the threat of receiving a reduced price for a volume of assets is present within a 
market because investors sell the assets, which results in increased liquidity. However, instrument liquidity is the 
level of risk associated with being able to trade financial instruments without a loss of value (Brunnermeier & 
Pedersen, 2009). An example of instrument risk might be securitized mortgages and the threat of taking a loss on the 
sale of securitized mortgages. In comparison, liquidity risk for banks is the ability of banks to raise funds to meet 
obligations without incurring high costs or losses (Jasevičienė, Jasiene, Martinavicius, Jaseviciene, & Krivkiene, 
2012; Ismal, 2010).  
 Liquidity risk is created as banks use short-term funds to make long-term investments, such as offering 30-
year mortgage loans to customers (Ratnovski, 2013). In fact, in recent years, loan commitments have been a major 
source of liquidity risk for banks (Gatev, Schuermann, & Strahan, 2007). The argument has been made that bank 
liquidity risk is actually associated with market and instrument risk because, as change occurs in market conditions, 
such as price levels of homes, which brings the threat that securitized mortgages will sell for less, the result can be 
increased liquidity risk for banks that have invested large amounts of their capital into mortgages (Acharya & 
Schaefer, 2006). Customer deposits into banks is one of the mechanisms by which liquidity risk is reduced, because 
as larger amounts of money are placed into banks, there is a greater amount of short-term liquid assets available to 
cover the illiquid securities that banks purchase and the illiquid investments that banks make, such as mortgage 
loans (Diamond & Rajan, 2001). 
 The problem that banks have faced with regards to customer deposits in recent years and particularly before 
the financial crisis is that the overall value of deposits has declined, in favor of investments in the stock and bond 
markets. At the same time, banks turned away from focusing on their fiduciary roles with customers and focused on 
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generating revenues and profits from investments (Bergevin, Calmes & Theoret, 2013). The combination of reduced 
liquid assets and the larger use of capital for illiquid investments has created the increased threat of liquidity risk for 
banks.   
 The threat of banks having high levels of liquidity risk and not properly managing liquidity risk is the 
reason that Basel III requirements have been released. The Basel III requirements create an international standard for 
bank liquidity for the first time (Gomes & Khan, 2011). An international standard for determining acceptable bank 
liquidity is considered to be important to achieve and maintain a global financial stability (Ramona, 2013). Liquidity 
risk does not affect only those banks that are unable to properly manage their assets and liabilities; instead, liquidity 
risk can impact banks that are able to manage their assets and liabilities. The financial crisis that began in 2008 came 
to the attention of the public because of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. As depositors learned about the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, they rushed to remove their money from that bank and many other banks, which 
created liquidity problems across the entire banking sector (Hartlage, 2012).  
Bank liquidity 
 While there is no recent research regarding bank liquidity in Canada, it is helpful to examine some of the 
recent literature about changes in bank liquidity in other countries, as well as studies in which the impact of Basel III 
requirements have been investigated. From these studies, it may be possible to hypothesize whether Canadian banks 
may be able to meet Basel III liquidity coverage ratio requirements. A study was conducted regarding changes in 
bank liquidity in the Bahamas and Caribbean nations from 2001 to 2012 (Jordan, Branch, McQuay, Cooper & 
Smith, 2013). While the study was not conducted in relation to Basel III requirements, it can provide some valuable 
information about how bank liquidity in a particular part of the world has changed over the course of the past 
decade, including the period in which the financial crisis occurred. The data showed that liquidity had increased in 
many Caribbean nations. In the Bahamas, the authors of the study noted that increased liquidity was due to a decline 
in demand for credit, as well as increased caution in issuing loans on the part of banks because of increased 
delinquencies of outstanding loans.  
 One of the issues that has already been mentioned is the argument that market liquidity is associated with 
bank liquidity (Acharya & Schaefer, 2006). Vogiazas and Alexiou (2013) investigated liquidity and the business 
cycle among banks in Greece using data from 2004 to 2010. The researchers found that there was a significant 
relationship between market conditions in the country and the liquidity of Greek banks. As market conditions 
worsened for the country and on a global scale, bank liquidity was harmed, and bank liquidity also declined. The 
importance of this research may be less about changes in liquidity in Greece and more about the way in which banks 
in that country have been impacted by market conditions. The authors of the study argued that banks need strong 
basis of capital during periods of macroeconomic growth, as well as during periods of macroeconomic decline. In 
this regard, the larger argument would seem to be that it is necessary to put into place rules and controls in order to 
ensure that banks control liquidity risk regardless of the conditions in the macroeconomy.  
 In a similar type of study, Sohaimi (2013) investigated liquidity risk and performance on the capital 
reserves of banks in Malaysia. The researchers found that there was an association between performance and 
liquidity risk. Specifically, the researchers found that non-performing loans were associated with periods of 
increased bank liquidity. While these results may not seem that surprising, they do support the idea that larger 
market conditions do have a relationship with bank liquidity. Further evidence for the idea of market conditions 
being associated with bank liquidity risk is found in a study conducted by Rafea and Rad (2014), in which the 
liquidity risk of a single bank branch in Iran was examined for the period of 2008 to 2012; the study revealed that 
bank liquidity risk changed dramatically in 2008 and 2009, but not 2011 and 2012. The reason for the increase in 
liquidity risk in 2008 and 2009 seemed to be the bank’s focus on a specific source of deposits and banking products.  
 Finally, studies in which the impact of Basel III requirements has been investigated across Europe show 
differing results due to differences in existing banking risk across European nations. For example, Nucu (2011) 
investigated the potential impact of Basel III on Romanian banks, and concluded that the impact is likely to be 
limited. That limited impact is likely to be due to the way in which banks in Romania structure that funds that 
already results in reduced liquidity risk. However, another study, which examined the liquidity of banks in Romania, 
showed that the overall liquidity of Romanian banks declined to 0.81 in 2011 from 1.03 in 2007 (Maria, Andrei, 
Catalin & Anamaria, 2013). However, a liquidity level of 81% in 2011 following the financial crisis does indicate 
that Romanian banks do indeed have a high level of liquidity even without the Basel III requirements.  
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 Finally, Avadanei (2013) investigated bank liquidity in the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Croatia 
in relation to Basel III requirements. The researcher found that banks in the Czech Republic and Croatia were best 
prepared to handle shocks through low levels of liquidity risk, while banks in Romania had good levels of capital to 
handle shocks. The researcher explained that while banks in Poland were also likely able to handle shocks, there 
were some liquidity issues present.  
 Overall, the literature that has been reviewed regarding bank liquidity in different parts of the world seems 
to allow for the conclusion that the financial crisis has actually made banks better able to handle the new Basel III 
requirements because of the problems that have already occurred. It was the credit crisis that caused banks to have to 
reduce the level of liabilities on their balance sheets. In this regard, the hypothesis that can be made is that banks in 
Canada are likely to be ready to meet Basel III requirements because of their own actions, either voluntary or 
involuntary, to reduce liquidity risk in the aftermath of the financial crisis.  
Conceptual framework 
 The conceptual framework for this study, as well as for the Basel III rules to reduce liquidity risk, is the 
liquidity coverage ratio. Under Basel III requirements, the liquidity coverage ratio of a bank is calculated by taking 
the value of high-quality liquid assets and dividing by total net cash flows over the next 30 calendar days (Bech & 
Keister, 2012; van den End, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
Where: 
 LCR =  Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
 HQLA = High Quality liquid Assets 
 NCF =  Net Cash Flow Over Next 30 Days 
 
An important part of the concept of the liquidity ratio under Basel III is what is considered to be high-
quality liquid assets. The assets that are considered to be high quality and liquid are those which can easily and 
immediately convert into cash with little or no change in their values (Bank for International Settlements, 2013). 
 The minimum liquidity ratio required under Basel III begins at 60% in 2015 and increases to 100% in 2019. 
Table 1 shows the minimum required liquidity coverage ratio for each year (Bank for International Settlements, 
2013). 
 
Table 1: Minimum required liquid coverage ratio 
  2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
 
Minimum LCR Requirement  60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Source: Bank for International Settlements, 2013 
  
The actual assets that are considered to be of a high quality and easily converted to cash with little or no change in 
value are categorized as Level 1 and Level 2 assets. Level 1 assets are cash, central bank reserves, and sovereign 
debt that qualifies for a weighted risk of 0% under the credit risk standards of Basel II. Level 2 assets are sovereign 
debts that qualify for a weighted risk of 20% under Basel III, as well as corporate bonds and covered bonds that 
have a minimum of an AA- credit rating. In order to determine the total value of high-quality liquid assets for the 
liquidity risk, at least 60% of a bank’s assets that are considered to be high-quality liquid assets must be Level 1 
assets, while no more than 40% of the assets can be Level 2 assets (AFME, 2014). 
NCF
HQLA
LCR 
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Research methodology 
 In order to test the liquidity coverage ratios of Canadian banks using the Basel III methodology, 
information would be needed regarding the amount of Level 1 and Level 2 assets held by the banks. Unfortunately, 
such information is currently considered to be confidential, and will not be publicly available until after January 
2015, which is the data of the requirement to comply with the Basel III liquidity coverage ratio requirement. In order 
to overcome the inability to obtain the specific data that Canadian banks will have to use in order to show 
compliance with Basel III requirements, the standard calculation of the quick ratio. The use of the quick ratio to 
determine the liquidity coverage of the banks in this study is appropriate considering that the liquidity coverage ratio 
created under Basel III actual builds upon the liquidity ratios that are traditionally used in business (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2013). Furthermore, the quick ratio is a measure that is widely used in business to 
measure a company’s short-term liquidity. The formula for the quick ratio that is used as the substitute for the 
liquidity coverage ratio for this investigation was carried out by using the liquid assets listed on the balance sheets of 
the Canadian banks included in this study. 
  
 
 
  
Where: 
 LR =  Liquidity Ratio 
LA =  Liquid Assets Listed on Balance Sheet  
LB =  Liabilities Listed on Balance Sheet  
         
 
While all liquid assets were used in the calculation, the liquidity coverage ratios that are reported in this 
study are likely close to the actual liquidity coverage ratios that will be calculated using the Level 1 and Level 2 
requirements of Basel III. In addition, this method of determining the liquidity coverage ratios of Canadian banks is 
appropriate to draw conclusions about the readiness of the banks to meet the actual Basel III regulations beginning 
in 2015 when the initial requirement is a liquidity coverage ratio of only 60%. 
Data 
 The data for this study was drawn from the balance sheets of six major Canadian banks. The Canadian 
banks that were included in the study were Bank of Montreal (BMO), Bank of Nova Scotia (Scotiabank), Canadian 
Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), National Bank, Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), and Toronto-Dominion Bank 
(TD). These six banks are the largest banks in Canada, and are often referred to in Canada as “the Big Six”. 
Furthermore, the country’s federal regulator designated these six banks in 2013 as being “too big to fail”, as they 
account for more than 90% of the total banking assets in the country (The Canadian Press, 2013). The liquid assets 
and liabilities for each of the banks were gathered for the period from 2009 to 2013. The reason for using this period 
was that 2009 was the first full year after the financial crisis began; using data from 2009 to 2013 allowed for the 
ability to examine the trend in the changes in liquidity coverage for the banks in the aftermath of the financial crisis.  
Data analysis 
 The analysis of the data consisted for calculating the liquidity ratios for the banks in this study for each of 
the years from 2009 to 2013 in order to determine if they are in compliance with the Basel III requirements that take 
effect in 2015 based on the data from 2013. However, beyond simply examining the liquidity coverage ratios 
calculated for the banks in this study using the data from 2013, the trends in changes in liquidity coverage ratios 
were also examined. It is important to note that the examination of the data is focused on each individual bank, as 
opposed to the six banks in this study as a group. Higher-level statistical tests could have been performed using the 
data from all of the banks included in the study. The decision was made to avoid performing higher-level statistical 
tests on the combined data from all of the banks. The reason for this is that under Basel III, each bank must 
individually meet the liquidity coverage ratio requirements. While the banks in a particular country may have an 
LB
LA
LR 
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overall level of meeting the Basel III requirements that is high, any individual bank can be in non-compliance with 
the liquidity requirements. Therefore, we examine Canadian banks individually. 
Analysis and findings 
 Table 2 shows the liquid assets for each of the six banks individually, as well as the overall level of 
liquidity for all of the banks from 2009 through 2013. The data show that from the period of 2009 through 2013, 
each of the six banks raised the value of their liquid assets. For example, BMO increased the value of its liquid 
assets from about $268 million in 2009 to about $488 million in 2013, while CIBC increased the value of its liquid 
assets from about $193 million to about $229 million. Of all of the banks in the sample, CIBC seemed to have the 
lowest level of increase in liquid assets. 
 
Table 2: Liquid assets of Canadian banks (in Canadian dollars) 
  Bank of 
Montreal 
Scotiabank Canadian 
Imperial 
Bank of 
Commerce 
National 
Bank 
Royal Bank 
of Canada 
Toronto-
Dominion 
Bank 
2009 268,162,144 341,210,035 192,874,351 96,463,444 397,643,278 364,754,734 
2010 285,474,347 353,016,357 204,329,914 107,458,389 445,785,633 414,752,116 
2011 433,829,459 452,233,154 224,723,711 144,045,276 540,680,652 591,919,577 
2012 463,371,160 506,368,511 215,472,792 159,452,300 573,907,001 631,724,867 
2013 488,147,287 551,105,146 228,765,133 169,352,869 626,241,370 680,158,608 
Source: Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (2014) 
  
 Table 3 shows the percentage increase in the liquid assets of each of the six banks in the study from 2009 to 
2013. The table shows that CIBC did have the lowest increase in the value of liquid assets of the six banks with an 
increase in liquid assets of just 18.6%. In comparison, BMO increased its liquid assets by 82% from 2009 to 2013, 
while TD actually achieved an 86% increase in the value of its liquid assets during that period. Interestingly, CIBC 
was the only bank of the six banks in this study that experienced an increase in liquid asset of less than 50% s from 
2009 to 2013. 
  
Table 3: Percentage increase in liquid assets from 2009 to 2013 
Bank of 
Montreal 
Scotiabank Canadian 
Imperial 
Bank of 
Commerce 
National 
Bank 
Royal Bank 
of Canada 
Toronto-
Dominion 
Bank 
82.03% 61.51% 18.61% 75.56% 57.49% 86.47% 
 
  
Table 4 shows the liabilities of each of the six banks in this study from 2009 to 2013. The data show that all 
of the banks in the study experienced increases in liabilities in the five years following the financial crisis. However, 
this is not surprising given that the costs of operations likely increased as a result of normal increases in costs and 
inflation. In addition, all of the banks in this study experienced increases in liquid assets, so the increases in 
liabilities does not necessarily mean that the banks have a liquidity problem simply because liabilities increased 
during the same period. 
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Table 4:  Liabilities of Canadian Banks (in Canadian Dollars) 
 Bank of 
Montreal 
Scotiabank Canadian 
Imperial 
Bank of 
Commerce 
National 
Bank 
Royal Bank 
of Canada 
Toronto-
Dominion 
Bank 
2009 368,261,053 471,743,402 321,669,175 125,663,746 613,183,006 518,500,086 
2010 389,760,092 499,025,518 336,250,377 138,093,597 687,255,874 577,242,274 
2011 449,299,762 542,496,160 336,358,850 148,960,804 709,994,509 639,507,875 
2012 495,359,453 626,665,243 376,347,855 169,662,425 779,071,789 762,405,897 
2013 505,817,696 697,236,637 379,960,670 179,042,760 810,484,048 810,560,140 
Source: Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (2014) 
  
Table 5 shows the percentage increase in the liabilities of the Canadian banks in this study from 2009 to 
2013. CIBC has the lowest percentage increase in liabilities of the six banks in the study from 2009 to 2013, at 18%. 
TD had the largest overall percentage increase in liabilities from 2009 to 2013, at 56%. TD was the only bank in the 
sample that had an overall increase in liabilities larger than 50% in the five years after the financial crisis  
  
Table 5: Percent change in liquid assets from 2009 to 2013 
Bank of 
Montreal 
Scotiabank Canadian 
Imperial 
Bank of 
Commerce 
National 
Bank 
Royal Bank 
of Canada 
Toronto-
Dominion 
Bank 
37.35% 47.80% 18.12% 42.48% 32.18% 56.33% 
 
 
 Figure 1 shows the overall percentage increases in liquid assets and liabilities for each of the six banks in 
the study. Five of the six banks in the study experienced increases in liquid assets in the five years following the 
financial crisis that were larger than the increases in liabilities that occurred. CIBC, however, had about the same 
level of increase for both its liquid assets and its liabilities, which was about 18%. This could be problematic for 
CIBC as it suggests that the bank may have had the same liquidity level in 2013 as it had in 2009. If CIBC’s 
liquidity level was low in 2009, then its liquidity level likely remained low in 2013.  
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Figure 1:  Comparison of change in liquid assets and liabilities from 2009 to 2013 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 shows the liquidity coverage ratios for each of the banks for each year from 2009 through 2013. 
The table shows that each of the six banks in this study did increase their liquidity coverage ratios in the five years 
following the financial crisis. Perhaps more importantly with regards to the implementation of Basel III 
requirements in 2015, five of the six banks in the study had liquidity coverage ratios in 2013 that were well above 
the 60% liquidity coverage ratio that will be required in 2015. BMO and National were prepared to meet the Basel 
III liquidity coverage ratio requirement for 2018, as they had liquidity coverage ratios in 2013 of 96.51% and 
94.59%, respectively. TD was prepared to meet the 2018 liquidity coverage ratio requirement of 80% in 2013 with a 
liquidity coverage ratio of 83.91%. Scotiabank and RBC were able to meet the 2016 Basel III liquidity coverage 
ratio requirement of 70%, as they had liquidity coverage ratios in 2013 of 79.04% and 77.27%, respectively. 
 
Table 6: Liquidity coverage ratio of Canadian banks 
  Bank of 
Montreal 
Scotiabank Canadian 
Imperial 
Bank of 
Commerce 
National 
Bank 
Royal Bank 
of Canada 
Toronto-
Dominion 
Bank 
2009 72.82% 72.33% 59.96% 76.76% 64.85% 70.35% 
2010 73.24% 70.74% 60.77% 77.82% 64.86% 71.85% 
2011 96.56% 83.36% 66.81% 96.70% 76.15% 92.56% 
2012 93.54% 80.80% 57.25% 93.98% 73.67% 82.86% 
2013 96.51% 79.04% 60.21% 94.59% 77.27% 83.91% 
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 For the five banks that have been discussed thus far – BMO, Scotiabank, National Bank, RBC, and TD – it 
seems appropriate to conclude that they are ready to meet the Basel III liquidity coverage ratio requirements that 
will take effect in 2015. In 2013, each of these five banks had liquidity coverage ratios that would have allowed 
them to meet at least the 2016 requirement of a 70% liquidity coverage ratio. Even more, BMO and National Bank 
were nearly able to meet the full 2019 Basel III requirement of 100% liquidity coverage ratios, as those two banks 
had liquidity coverage ratios in 2013 that were above 90%.  
 While the ability to meet specific liquidity coverage ratios in a single year is important, it is also necessary 
to examine the trends in the liquidity coverage ratios of those five banks over the course of the five years following 
the financial crisis. Each of the five banks did experience a slight decline in their liquidity coverage ratios from 2011 
to 2012. However, BMO, National Bank, RBC, and TD did increase their liquidity coverage ratios from 2012 to 
2013. Scotiabank did not increase its liquidity coverage ratio from 2012 to 2013. Instead, Scotiabank’s liquidity 
coverage ratio declined from 83.36% in 2011 to 80.80% in 2012, followed by a further decrease to 79.04% in 2013. 
While Scotiabank was well ahead of the 2015 Basel III liquidity coverage ratio requirement in 2013, the bank’s 
leaders may want to closely watch its liquid assets and liabilities in order to ensure that further declines that could 
harm its ability to meet the 2016 liquidity coverage ratio requirement do not occur.  
 The one bank in the sample that has not yet been discussed in terms of its liquidity coverage ratio is CIBC. 
Of all six banks, CIBC had the lowest liquidity coverage ratio from 2009 through 2013. More importantly with 
regards to the Basel III requirements, CIBC had a liquidity coverage ratio in 2013 of 60.21%. In 2013, CIBC was 
barely able to meet the 2015 liquidity coverage ratio requirement of 60%. The bank’s liquidity ratio did increase 
from 57.25% in 2012 to 60.21% in 2013, but the risk remains that even a very small decline in CIBC’s liquidity 
coverage ratio would mean not being in compliance with Basel III requirements for 2015.  
 On a broader level, the other five banks in this study were able to meet the minimum Basel III requirements 
outlined for 2015 in 2009. In fact, BMO, Scotiabank, National Bank, and TD could have met the 2016 Basel III 
liquidity coverage ratio requirement of 70% in 2009. CIBC was not able to meet the 2015 liquidity coverage ratio 
requirement in 2009, and was not in compliance with that requirement in 2012. In the five years following the 
financial crisis, CIBC has moved from being in compliance to not being in compliance with 2015 requirements, and 
only barely met those requirements in 2013. 
 Based on the data that have been analyzed, most of the large Canadian banks appear to be ready to meet the 
Basel III requirements that begin in 2015. Even if the banks experience some decline in their liquidity coverage 
ratios, they should be able to meet the 2015 requirements, as most are actually already able to meet the 2016 or 2017 
requirements; the one exception to this, however, is CIBC, which is indeed a bank that deserves further attention and 
some concern on the part of investors, customers, and financial regulators about its readiness to meet Basel III 
liquidity coverage ratio requirements. The goal for both banks and regulators in Canada should be to ensure that 
banks have some sort of  buffer, in order to be able meet the 2015 Basel III requirements.  
Discussion 
 The results of this study would seem to be positive in terms of the ability of most of the major Canadian 
banks to meet Basel III liquidity coverage ratio requirements for 2015. However, it is useful to compare the 
readiness of the major Canadian banks in this study with Basel III requirements with their US and European 
counterparts. The data and studies regarding the ability of banks in Europe to fully comply with the liquidity 
coverage ratio requirements of Basel III seem to be in conflict. For example, the authors (Sutorova & Teply, 2013) 
of the recent study regarding the impact of Basel III liquidity requirements on banks in Europe argued that many 
banks in the European Union were already complying with Basel III liquidity requirements. Other researchers, 
however, have argued that large European banks will likely have to reduce lending in order to reduce the liabilities 
on their balance sheets so that they will be in full compliance with Basel III (Allen, Kei, Chan, Milne & Thomas, 
2012). Furthermore, the European Banking Authority was reported to have indicated that at the end of 2012, the 
largest banks in Europe were nearly $100 billion Canadian Dollars short of being able to meet the capital 
requirements of Basel III (CBC News, 2013).  
 In terms of the ability of banks in the US to meet the liquidity requirements of Basel III, a recent report 
found that 20 of the 26 largest banks in the US were able or would be able to meet those requirements (Weinberger, 
2014). However, the report also stated that six of the largest banks in the US, namely State Street Corp., the Bank of 
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New York Mellon Corp, Comerica, Inc., U.S. Bancorp, Northern Trust Corp., and M&T Bank, were not prepared to 
meet the liquidity requirements of Basel III as of the first quarter of 2014.  
 In comparison to banks in Europe and the US, it would seem that the largest banks in Canada are as 
prepared or even better prepared to meet Basel III requirements. The largest banks in the United States and Canada 
seem to generally have the same level of readiness to meet Basel III. Unfortunately, Europe seems to be particularly 
problematic in terms of banks meeting Basel III liquidity requirements because of the vast differences in lending 
practices and the amount of capital held by banks in different countries across the continent (Howarth & Quaglia, 
2013). Unlike the US or Canada, the vastly different economic conditions and structures of the many countries that 
comprise the European Union may mean that overall, European banks are indeed less prepared to meet Basel III 
requirements.  
Conclusion 
 The purpose of this study has been to analyze and test the current Canadian bank liquidity coverage ratio in 
order to draw conclusions about the readiness of Canadian banks to meet Basel III regulations. From a broad 
perspective, the data that has been analyzed allows for the conclusion that most large Canadian banks are ready to 
meet the Basel III liquidity coverage ratio requirements. However, the results of the data analysis conducted in this 
study showed that not all large Canadian banks are on solid enough ground to be able to meet the Basel III liquidity 
coverage ratio requirements. Specifically, CIBC had a liquidity coverage ratio of 60% in 2013, but that was actually 
an improvement from 2012, when the bank had a liquidity coverage ratio of 57.25%. The bank’s data show that 
CIBC may not be able to meet and maintain compliance with the 2015 requirement of a liquidity coverage ratio of 
60%, and certainly has the risk of not meeting the 2017 Basel III requirement of a 70% liquidity coverage ratio.  
 While the overall data indicate that most large Canadian banks are indeed ready to meet the Basel III 
requirements that take effect in 2015, regulators in Canada should avoid being blindsided by the broad data and 
examine the data from each bank in the country. Basel III requirements are implemented for each bank, not for an 
entire nation. This means that while most Canadian banks may be well prepared for demonstrating compliance with 
Basel III, some banks may not be ready to demonstrate compliance. It would be easy for financial regulators in 
Canada to be happy with the overall findings of this study, to the point of ignoring the fact that one of the country’s 
major banks, CIBC, may not be able to comply with Basel III requirements.  
 Another issue that must be considered for banks that are only slightly prepared to meet the 2015 Basel III 
liquidity requirements is that liquidity coverage ratio requirements increase by 10% each year until 2019. For banks 
that are only slightly prepared to meet the 2015 requirements, the question must be raised as to whether they can 
realistically increase their liquidity coverage ratios by 10% in a single year. Unfortunately, some type of government 
intervention might be necessary to ensure that banks that are already struggling will be able to achieve full 
compliance with Basel III in 2015, and can achieve compliance with the increasing liquidity requirements that will 
occur until 2019.  
 The primary limitation of this study is the way in which the liquidity coverage ratios of the banks that were 
investigated were calculated. The argument could be made that the results of this study may not accurately reflect 
the actual liquidity coverage ratios of the banks that have been examined, as it was not possible to determine the 
actual liquid assets that would qualify under Basel III requirements. While this might affect the specific liquidity 
coverage ratios of the banks that were examined, it seems unlikely that this would cause a bank that was deemed to 
have a high liquidity coverage ratio to actually show an inability to comply with Basel III in 2015. The one 
exception to this might be CIBC. Once CIBC’s actual liquid assets that qualify as highly liquid and of a high-quality 
under Basel III are examined, the bank may demonstrate further problems achieving and maintaining Basel III 
compliance. In this regard, rather than focusing on the finding that CIBC can comply with the 2015 Basel III 
liquidity requirement, regulators need to focus on the decisions of CIBC and all banks as to how they plan to achieve 
and maintain Basel III compliance on a permanent basis.  
 Considering that Basel III requirements will be implemented in the very near future, the recommendation 
for future research is to investigate the characteristics and conditions of those banks that are found to not be in 
compliance with Basel III liquidity coverage ratio requirements once they take affect in 2015. Once the requirements 
take full effect, the role for researchers will need to be one of helping to identify why certain banks are not meeting 
requirements, and what is needed for those banks to come into compliance with Basel III. Even in a country such as 
Canada, the potential for one of the big six banks to not be in compliance with Basel III presents an important 
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opportunity to examine why the bank was not ready before compliance was required, and to highlight the internal 
actions that may have resulted in a lack of compliance if such an event were to occur.  
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